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n recent years, members of Congress and aca-
demia have repeatedly urged the U.S. Treasury
to issue some portion of its debt in the form of
inflation indexed bonds. With an indexed bond, the
interest and maturity value are adjusted by the rate
of inflation over the life of the bond. Because the
cash flow of an indexed bond is adjusted for infla-
tion, the bond’s real value does not vary with infla-
tion, protecting investors and issuers alike from
inflation risk.
Inflation indexed bonds would be a fundamental
innovation in U.S. financial markets, providing
benefits to investors, the Treasury, and policymak-
ers. Despite the potential benefits, the U.S. Treasury
has never issued indexed bonds. In fact, only a
handful of industrialized countries, including the
United Kingdom and Canada, have issued inflation
indexed government bonds.
This article discusses the benefits of inflation
indexed Treasury bonds and points out some of their
limitations. The first section shows how indexed
bonds differ from conventional bonds. The second
section discusses why investors, the Treasury, and
policymakers would benefit from adding indexed
bonds to the spectrum of U.S. Treasury debt instru-
ments. The third section discusses some of the
technical limitations of the bonds. The article con-
cludes that, if carefully designed, inflation indexed
Treasury bonds are likely to be beneficial.
WHAT ARE INFLATION INDEXED
BONDS?
An inflation indexed bond protects both investors
and issuers from the uncertainty of inflation over
the life of the bond.
1 Like conventional bonds,
indexed bonds pay interest at fixed intervals and
return the principal at maturity. The fundamental
difference is that while conventional bonds make
payments that are fixed in nominal dollars (and thus
are called nominal bonds), indexed bonds make pay-
ments that are fixed in real terms (and thus are called
real bonds). Because the purchasing power of fixed
nominal cash flows is reduced by inflation, nominal
bonds expose both investors and issuers to the risk
of changes in inflation, while real bonds do not.
To understand the advantages of inflation indexed
bonds over nominal bonds, it is useful to examine
the yield of a nominal bond under several inflation
scenarios. For illustrative purposes, assume an in-
vestor buys a $100, 10-year bond that pays interest
annually and $100 at maturity. In the first scenario,
which is characterized by zero inflation, the bond
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yield of the bond is 3 percent.
2 The real (inflation
adjusted) yield is also 3 percent because the real
cash flow and the nominal cash flow are equal when
there is no inflation. 
In the second scenario, inflation is assumed to be
4 percent, but there is still no uncertainty about
inflation. Because inflation erodes the purchasing
power of nominal payments, the relevant yield to
examine is not the nominal yield, but the real yield.
The real yield (r) that corresponds to a nominal
yield (i) when the actual inflation rate (p) is known
is given by the Fisher identity: r = i - p, which states
the real yield equals the nominal yield less the
inflation rate.
3 In this case, to keep the real yield on
the nominal bond at 3 percent, the same as under
the no-inflation scenario, the nominal yield on the
bond has to rise to 7 percent (i = r + p = 3 + 4).
Thus, with positive inflation but no uncertainty
about its level, bond issuers simply raise the nomi-
nal coupon rate to 7 percent so that the real yield to
investors (and real cost to issuers) remains the same
as in the zero-inflation scenario.
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In the real world, however, inflation uncertainty
creates a risk for both investors and issuers. When-
ever actual inflation differs from what was ex-
pected, the real yield of the bond also differs from
what was expected. In the third scenario, actual
inflation doubles to 8 percent soon after the bond is
issued and remains steady for the life of the bond.
In this case, investors lose since the real yield of the
bond becomes a negative 1 percent (7 - 8 = -1),
which is much less than the 3 percent expected by
investors. By contrast, in the fourth scenario, actual
inflation drops to 2 percent after the bond is issued
and remains steady. In this case, issuers lose since
the real yield, and thus the real cost of servicing the
bond, becomes 5 percent (7 - 2 = 5), which is much
more than the issuers were prepared to pay.
These last two scenarios illustrate the inflation
risk of nominal bonds. While the nominal yield of
a bond can be adjusted to account for expected
inflation at the time the bond is issued, the bond’s
actual real yield varies with actual inflation, which
can be quite different from what was expected. If
actual inflation rises unexpectedly, the real rate
falls; and if inflation declines unexpectedly, the real
rate increases. Because it is impossible to know
with certainty the actual rate of future inflation,
inflation risk is intrinsic to nominal bonds and
cannot be eliminated.
In contrast to nominal bonds, inflation indexed or
real bonds have no inflation risk. By design, the
nominal cash flow of a real bond is adjusted by the
cumulative rate of inflation to insulate its real cash
flow, and therefore its real yield, from changes in
inflation. In other words, while a nominal bond’s
cash flow and nominal yield are adjusted by ex-
pected inflation when the bond is issued, the coupon
payments and maturity value of a real bond are
adjusted over the entire life of the bond. The adjust-
ment is made after inflation occurs to achieve the
real yield that investors and issuers agreed upon at
the time of issuance.
Table 1 shows why indexed bonds have no infla-
tion risk even when actual inflation differs from
what was expected. The table shows the real and
nominal cash flows of a 10-year, $100 indexed bond
that has a 3 percent coupon rate under the four
inflation scenarios discussed above.
5 The real cash
flow is shown just once since it is the same regard-
less of the actual level of inflation. Notice that when
inflation is zero, the nominal cash flow and real cash
flow of the indexed bond are exactly the same. As
inflation rises, both the nominal coupon payments
and maturity value rise to maintain the 3 percent
real yield.
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While indexing insulates all bonds from inflation
risk, the advantage of indexing is greater for long-
term bonds than for short-term bonds, due mainly
to differences in inflation risk. Inflation risk for
long-term nominal bonds is significant, while infla-
42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtion risk for short-term nominal bonds is relatively
minor. One reason for this difference is that inflation
is much easier to forecast in the short term.
7 In other
words, the difference between actual and expected
inflation is much smaller for short-term forecasts of
inflation. Another reason that short-term nominal
bonds have less inflation risk is that changes in
inflation will affect the value of a short-term bond
much less than a long-term bond due to the effect
of compounding. For example, consider two nomi-
nal bonds that, for expositional simplicity, have no
coupon payments and pay back $100 at maturity.
One bond has a one-year maturity and the other has
a ten-year maturity. With inflation at 4 percent, the
real principal of the 1-year bond is $96.15
(100/1.04); with inflation at 8 percent, the real
principal falls to $92.59 (100/1.08). Thus, for this
short-term bond, the doubling of inflation reduces
the real value by less than 4 percent. For the 10-year
bond, in contrast, the doubling of inflation reduces
the real value of the bond from $67.56 (100/1.04
10)
to $46.32 (100/1.08
10), which is a 37 percent decline.
8
Because long-term nominal bonds carry substantial
inflation risk while short-term nominal bonds carry
little inflation risk, investors and issuers are more
likely to be interested in long-term indexed bonds
than short-term bonds.
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Surprisingly, few industrialized countries have
issued indexed bonds. Australia, Canada, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom have issued indexed gov-
ernment bonds (Table 2). New Zealand has indi-
cated an interest in doing so.
10 The United Kingdom
has issued the greatest amount of indexed bonds.
The UK government began issuing indexed bonds,
called index-linked gilts, in 1981. Because short-
term nominal bonds carry little inflation risk, it is
not surprising that the majority of indexed bonds in
the United Kingdom are long-term bonds with ma-
turities of at least 15 years. Currently, there are 13
such bonds outstanding, with (remaining) maturity
ranging from 2 to 35 years. The total face value of
these indexed bonds is over 20 billion pounds, or
about 11 percent of the total face value of the UK’s
Table 1
REAL AND NOMINAL CASH FLOW OF AN INDEXED BOND
(Dollars)
Nominal cash flow under various inflation rates
Year Real cash flow  0   2   4   8 
1 3 33 . 0 63 . 1 23 . 2 4
2 3 33 . 1 23 . 2 43 . 5 0
3 3 33 . 1 83 . 3 73 . 7 8
4 3 33 . 2 53 . 5 14 . 0 8
... ... ... ... ... ...
10 3 3 3.66 4.44 6.48
(principal) 100 100 121.90 148.02 215.90
Note: Except for the last row, all of the cash flows are coupon payments. The nominal cash flow in year k when inflation
is p equals the real cash flow times (1 + p)k.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 43outstanding government debt. In terms of market
value, the indexed bonds account for about 15
percent of the UK’s outstanding government debt.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
INFLATION INDEXED BONDS
Because inflation risk is generally a problem only
for long-term nominal bonds, the benefits of in-
dexed bonds are largely associated with long-term
bonds. This section discusses the benefits of such
bonds to investors, the Treasury, and policymakers.
Benefits to investors
The primary benefit to investors of long-term
indexed Treasury bonds is that they would give
investors a long-term asset with a fixed long-term
real yield that is free from inflation risk.
11 Histori-
cally, investors in long-term Treasury bonds have
been exposed to substantial inflation risk. In 1955,
for example, the Treasury issued a 40-year bond
with a coupon rate of 3 percent. Because the actual
inflation rate over the past 40 years was 4.4 percent,
an investor who bought this bond at full price and
held it to maturity received a negative 1.4 percent
yield on this investment (3 - 4.4 = -1.4).
While all investors would benefit from long-term
indexed bonds, such bonds would be particularly
desirable to the growing number of small, inexpe-
rienced investors who have to make long-term
investments for retirement. The number of such
investors is rising partly due to increasing public
awareness of the uncertain future of social security
benefits. In addition, many more small investors are
having to make long-term investment decisions
due to the trend of private pension plans switching
from traditional defined-benefit plans to defined-
contribution plans, where individual employees de-
cide on their pension investments instead of a
pension fund manager.
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Some people argue that indexed bonds are unnec-
essary because there are other ways to eliminate
inflation risk. For example, some suggest that pur-
chasing and then rolling over short-term Treasury
securities, such as 3-month or 30-day Treasury bills,
is a close alternative to investing in long-term in-
dexed bonds. Such a strategy has little inflation risk
Table 2
GOVERNMENT-ISSUED DOMESTIC CURRENCY DEBT








as percent of total
United Kingdom 37.4 315.9 11.8
Sweden 1.6 74.8 2.1
Australia 2.2 72.4 3.0
Canada 3.2 279.2 1.1
Source: Bank of England (Butler).
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little inflation risk, and second, the nominal yield of
such a portfolio would change to the market rate
whenever the portfolio rolls over. Others suggest
that investing in “real” assets, such as stocks, com-
modities, and real estate, would reduce inflation
risk considerably. None of these alternatives, how-
ever, is capable of offering investors fixed long-
term real yields that are free from inflation risk.
Rolling over 3-month Treasury bills is inferior to
investing in long-term indexed bonds if the in-
tended investment horizon is long term. One prob-
lem with this strategy is that instead of locking into
a known, fixed long-term yield, investors face un-
certain future short-term yields, and therefore, an
uncertain overall long-term yield. In essence, such
a strategy exchanges inflation risk for the risk of
uncertain real yields. Another problem with the
strategy is that the real yields on these short-term
assets are historically very low. For example, the
average annualized real yield on 30-day Treasury bills
from 1929 to 1994 was a mere 0.7 percent, compared
with a 2 percent real yield on 20-year Treasury
bonds over the same period (SBBI 1995 Yearbook).
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Investing in real assets would be an even less
satisfactory substitute for investing in indexed Trea-
sury bonds. First, none of the assets mentioned
above provide good protection against inflation.
The correlation between the yields on these assets
and inflation, which measures how closely the
yields vary with inflation, is typically quite low.
Over the postwar period, for example, the correla-
tion between inflation and the growth in the price
of gold, which many consider to be a relatively good
hedge against inflation, is only 0.47. Over the same
period, the correlation between inflation and the
yield on the S&P 500 index is a negative 0.30.
Another reason that “real assets” would be poor
substitutes for indexed Treasury bonds is that they
all carry other risks unrelated to inflation that are
hard to eliminate. For example, a firm’s stock is
exposed both to risks associated with the particular
firm and with the overall market.
14 Commodity and
real estate prices are influenced by demand and
supply as well as by their individual inventory
conditions. Moreover, diversifying risks in com-
modities and real estate is costly. In short, investing
in “real assets” simply means trading inflation risk
for other risks.
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Benefits to the U.S. Treasury
Like investors, the U.S. Treasury would benefit
from the inflation risk protection provided by in-
dexed bonds. In addition, the Treasury might bene-
fit from savings on its interest expense.
The U.S. Treasury, currently the biggest issuer of
nominal bonds, bears considerable inflation risk in
servicing its debt. For example, the Treasury con-
tinues to pay double-digit coupon rates on bonds
issued during the high-inflation era of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The most notable example is a
20-year bond issued in 1981 with a 15.75 percent
coupon rate. The real cost to the Treasury of this
bond was 6.85 percent in 1981, when inflation was
8.9 percent (15.75 - 8.9 = 6.85). But the real cost
soared to 13.05 percent last year, when inflation was
2.7 percent. If all of the Treasury’s outstanding debt
were indexed, the real cost of servicing its debt
would not vary inversely with inflation.
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Indexed bonds would also save the Treasury
money by eliminating an inflation risk premium
that is often part of the yield on nominal bonds. A
risk premium is the difference in the yields of two
assets due to differences in the riskiness of the
assets. Because investors do not like risk, issuers of
riskier assets typically have to pay higher yields to
compensate investors for taking on the additional risk.
Corporate bonds, for example, pay higher yields
than Treasury bonds with comparable maturities
since corporate bonds have default risk and Trea-
sury bonds do not. In other words, corporate bonds
carry a default risk premium. Similarly, because
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erable inflation risk, part of their yields could be an
inflation risk premium. Specifically, the nominal
yield on a conventional Treasury bond, i, would be
the sum of three components: the real yield, r, the
expected average inflation rate over the bond’s life,
p, and the inflation risk premium, prem (i = r + p
+ prem).
17 Because indexed bonds are free of infla-
tion risk, their nominal yields do not contain an
inflation risk premium (i = r + p). Assuming that,
on average, actual inflation equals expected infla-
tion (p = p), the cost of indexed bonds would be lower
by the size of the inflation risk premium. Thus, by
issuing indexed bonds instead of nominal bonds, the
Treasury would, on average, save money by elimi-
nating any inflation risk premium that might exist.
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Unfortunately, evidence on the size of the infla-
tion risk premium on government bonds is scarce
and inconclusive because of the lack of data on real
yields and expected inflation. John Campbell, a
prominent financial economist, estimates that the
lower bound of the inflation risk premium is a
negative 0.25 percent and that the upper bound is
1.35 percent.
19 The most likely number, he suggests,
is 0.5 percent.
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While the size of the inflation risk premium in
nominal bonds is uncertain, indexed bonds would
save U.S. taxpayers a lot of money as long as it is
positive because the Treasury borrows on an enor-
mous scale. Currently, the outstanding federal debt
held by the public is about $4 trillion, and the
Treasury has been borrowing about $200 billion
each year. Even if only 10 percent of the new
borrowings were through indexed bonds, the Trea-
sury would save $100 million a year if the inflation
risk premium is 0.5 percent ($200 billion times 10
percent times 0.5 percent). And if the Treasury
could eventually replace 10 percent of its existing
debt with indexed bonds, which could be as large
as $5 trillion by the end of the century, a 0.5 percent
savings would save taxpayers $25 billion in interest
payments each year.
Benefits to policymakers 
Policymakers would benefit from indexed bonds
by gaining information about real interest rates and
the market’s inflation expectations. A liquid market
for indexed Treasury bonds would provide accurate
information on real interest rates. Because the
nominal interest rate on a nominal Treasury bond is
the sum of the real interest rate, expected future
inflation, and the inflation risk premium, the differ-
ence between the rates on nominal and indexed
bonds is the sum of the expected rate of inflation
and the inflation risk premium. If the inflation risk
premium is relatively constant over time, changes
in the difference between the rates on nominal and
indexed bonds would largely reflect changes in
expected inflation.
Data from UK bond markets provide a good
example of the information policymakers might
gain from the addition of indexed bonds (Table 3).
On April 5, 1995, the real yield of an indexed UK
government bond maturing in 2001 (2 /  pc’ 01) was
3.95 percent, while the nominal yield of a conven-
tional bond maturing in the same year (7pc2001)
was 8.40 percent. The difference between the two
rates, 4.45 percent, is the sum of the average
expected inflation rate over the next six years and
the inflation risk premium.
21 By June 12, both the
nominal and real rates had fallen by about 0.4
percentage points. As a result, the difference
between the two rates was an almost identical
4.48 percent. Thus, the change in expected inflation
was negligible. Without these data on the real yield,
policymakers would not be able to tell whether
the 0.4 percentage point decline in the nominal rate
between April and June was due to an improved
inflation outlook or to changes in the real rate—a
question always facing U.S. policymakers.
Currently, without direct data on real interest
rates, policymakers in the United States have to rely
on surveys or statistical models to estimate inflation






46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmates from market data on nominal and indexed
bonds. In fact, survey data cannot be used to deter-
mine whether changes in nominal rates are caused
by changes in real rates or inflation expectations
over short time periods because they take a long
time to process and are only available for a limited
number of time horizons. In addition, surveys can
cover only a small group of people and often reflect
off-the-cuff answers. In contrast, data on Treasury
bonds are available as soon as trades occur, are
available for a range of time horizons, incorporate
opinions from all investors who are interested in
Treasury bonds, and reflect investors’ true beliefs
that are backed by their money. Furthermore, while
statistical models have many hidden assumptions
that make the results hard to interpret, using indexed
bonds requires few and explicit assumptions.
The information provided by indexed bonds
would be especially valuable to monetary policy-
makers. Information on expected inflation and its
changes, for example, would help monetary policy-
makers better understand inflationary pressures in
the economy, allowing them to make better adjust-
ments to monetary policy. Knowledge of inflation-
ary pressures is useful since inflation expectations
are somewhat self-fulfilling: businesses are more
likely to raise prices if they think inflation will be
higher, and consumers are more likely to accept the
higher prices if they perceive the increases are
consistent with the general inflation rate. As a result,
if policymakers could detect an increase in inflation
expectations, they would be able to take steps to
counter such a change more effectively.
The monetary authorities could also use informa-
tion about expected inflation and its changes to
assess the credibility of their anti-inflation policies.
Whether their credibility is strong or weak is impor-
tant for determining appropriate policy actions.
When credibility is strong, a slight tightening of
policy may be enough to convince people that in-
flation is under control and, therefore, enough to
reduce inflation expectations. On the other hand,
when credibility is weak, a more severe tightening
might be required to affect inflation expectations.
Fiscal policymakers, businesses, and consumers
could also benefit from information about real in-
terest rates and expected inflation. For example,
Congress could use the information on changes in









   ( 2 )    
Nominal yield
    ( 3 )     
p  + prem
(4)=(3)-(2)
Change in p
(5) = change in (4)
April 5, 1995 3.95 8.40 4.45 — 
June 12, 1995 3.51 7.99 4.48 .03
Note: The real yield in column (2) is the yield on an inflation-indexed UK government bond (2 /2 pc’01) that matures in
2001. The nominal yield in column (3) is the yield on a nominal UK government bond (7pc2001) that also matures in
2001. p is expected inflation and prem is the inflation risk premium. Column (5) assumes that prem is constant over the
period from April 5 to June 12. 
^
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1995 47efforts to balance the budget. Overall, the informa-
tion provided by indexed bonds would allow both
the private sector and policymakers to make better
economic decisions.
LIMITATIONS OF THE BENEFITS OF
INFLATION INDEXED BONDS
While inflation indexed Treasury bonds could
provide many benefits, these benefits could be par-
tially offset by some limitations arising from the
design and issuance of the bonds. Some of the
limitations are small and would not have much
effect on the benefits. Others are more serious, but
their effects could be minimized if addressed prop-
erly during the design and issuance of indexed
bonds.
Limitations related to indexing
The previous discussion of the benefits was based
on the assumption that there is a single, immediately
available, and perfect measure of inflation. In real-
ity, there are many inflation indexes, and none
meets the ideal conditions. Different indexes are
better measures of inflation for different sectors of
society. For example, an index that measures the
inflation rate facing investors most accurately
might not be a good measure of the inflation rate
relevant to the Treasury. Moreover, they all have
some measurement bias. Finally, because none of
the indexes are immediately available, a lagged
index must be used. While the lack of a single, ideal
index might reduce some of the benefits, the overall
effect would be small.
Limitations due to the choice of the inflation
index. If the Treasury issues indexed bonds, the
benefits to investors, the Treasury, and policymak-
ers would vary with the index actually used. The
choices include the implicit and fixed-weight GDP
price deflators, the producer price index (PPI), the
consumer price index (CPI), and the consumer price
index excluding food and energy (the core CPI).
Each of these indexes provides a different measure
of inflation because of differences in the baskets of
goods whose prices are being measured and in the
weights used to average the prices.
Since some indexes are better measures of infla-
tion for certain groups than for others, the benefits
for each group would vary with the choice of index.
For the Treasury, for example, the best measure of
inflation is the GDP deflator, because the Treasury’s
revenue is closely related to national income.
Therefore, if the main goal of issuing indexed bonds
is to protect the Treasury from inflation, the implicit
GDP deflator should be used. But because this is
not the best measure of inflation for consumers, the
benefits to investors would be reduced. On the other
hand, if the primary goal of issuing indexed bonds
is to protect investors from inflation, the CPI is the
most suitable index to use.
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While the benefits to different groups would vary
with the choice of the index, the differences are
likely to be small since the differences among the
indexes are small. The nominal maturity value, for
example, of a $100 real bond issued at the end of
1970 that matured at the end of 1994 would have
been $397.36 if it were adjusted by the CPI and
$369.86 if it were adjusted by the implicit GDP
deflator—a difference of a mere 7 percent.
Measurement biases of the inflation index. An-
other potential problem is that whichever index is
chosen, it is likely to be a biased measure of infla-
tion. Recently, concern has been voiced about mea-
surement biases in inflation indexes. Chairman
Greenspan, for example, testified in Congress that
he believed the CPI, on average, overstated infla-
tion by 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points every year. If
the chosen index is biased upward, indexed bonds
will pay out a higher inflation adjustment than
necessary. In addition, the extracted information
about real interest rates and expected inflation could
also be biased. As it turns out, however, these prob-
lems would have little effect on the benefits.
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states inflation, it does not necessarily mean that the
total payments on indexed bonds would be too
large. If there is an active market for indexed bonds
and people are aware of the bias, investors should
be willing to accept a lower real yield because they
expect inflation adjusted interest and principal pay-
ments to be greater than justified. For the indexed
bond in Table 1, for example, when the inflation
index is not biased, investors require a 3 percent real
rate. With a 4 percent inflation rate, the Treasury’s
total nominal interest expense is 7 percent. Now
suppose that the chosen index, on average, over-
states inflation by one percentage point a year. In
this case, market competition would drive the real
coupon rate on the indexed bond down to 2 percent.
As a result, the Treasury would pay a 2 percent real
rate on the indexed bond, plus a 5 percent CPI
adjustment, which is again 7 percent. Therefore, if
there is a competitive market for indexed bonds,
biases in the inflation index will not raise the Trea-
sury’s total payments.
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The bias in the index would not reduce the
information benefit to policymakers either, as long
as the bias remains stable over time. The important
information for policymakers is not the absolute
levels of either the real interest rate or inflation
expectations; rather, it is how they change in re-
sponse to policy actions and changes in economic
conditions. If the bias is stable over time, then the
information about changes in real rates and ex-
pected inflation from indexed and nominal bonds
would be accurate. Suppose, for example, that the
inflation index used in Table 3 overstates the UK’s
inflation by one percentage point on both dates. In
this case, the true real yield would be 4.95 percent
on April 5 and 4.51 percent on June 12, one percent-
age point higher than measured. The change in the
true real yield is 0.44 percent, the same as the
change in the measured real yield. In addition,
because the change in the measured real yield is
correct, the change in the measured inflation expec-
tations would also be accurate.
Limitations  caused by the lag of indexation.
While the choice of the index and the measurement
bias would not have much effect on the benefits
from indexed bonds, the practical necessity of lags
in indexation would have a more noticeable effect.
Lags in indexation are necessary because the value
of an index is known only with a lag. The CPI for a
given month, for example, is not known until the
middle of the following month, while the GDP
deflator in a given quarter is not known until the end
of the first month of the following quarter. As a
result, perfect indexing and full protection from
inflation is not possible.
In general, the lags are not very long and thus, by
themselves, are not a big problem. The lags become
a greater problem, however, due to the institutional
arrangements for trading and settling bonds be-
tween coupon payment dates. Currently, when a
bond is traded between coupon payment dates, the
buyer pays the seller the agreed-upon price of the
bond and the accrued interest. For example, if a
bond paying $2 interest on the first of February and
August (semiannually) is sold on the first of May,
the buyer will pay the seller $1 in addition to the
bond’s price. Then on the first of August, the buyer
simply keeps all of the $2 interest payment. This
arrangement allows bonds to be traded many
times without the need to keep track of every owner
for the six months prior to a coupon payment. With
indexed bonds, however, the next coupon payment,
and thus the accrued interest, cannot be known until
two months after the coupon payment date, which
can be up to eight months after the bond is sold,
because actual inflation cannot be known until then.
The institutional arrangements necessary to allow
the trading and settling of indexed bonds greatly
extend the necessary length of the indexation lags.
The institutional arrangement adopted by the
United Kingdom, for example, is to use an eight-
month lagged index. That is, the coupon payments
and the maturity value of an indexed bond are
adjusted by the inflation rate eight months before
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vestors are not protected from inflation risk over the
last eight months of an indexed bond’s life, because
an indexed bond with less than eight months to
maturity essentially becomes a nominal bond.
Another problem is that the lag in indexation
makes it more difficult to extract near-term infor-
mation on real interest rates and inflation expecta-
tions. Because of the lag, an indexed bond with less
than, say, two years to maturity still exposes inves-
tors to inflation risk because it is a nominal bond for
a third of its remaining life. Thus, its yield will no
longer reflect the true two-year real interest rate.
This is a significant problem for monetary policy-
makers whose policy actions are often based on the
economic outlook over horizons of one to two years.
While having to use a lagged index would reduce
some of the benefits of indexed bonds, the reduction
would be relatively small for several reasons. First,
while indexation lags would eliminate the protec-
tion against inflation for the last eight months before
a bond’s maturity, the inflation risk over an eight-
month period is small. Second, even though the
yield on a short-term indexed bond would no longer
truly reflect the short-term real interest rate, it would
provide some useful information. Moreover, the
information on longer term real yields and inflation
expectations would still be accurate. And finally, the
Treasury could minimize the effect of indexation
lags by issuing indexed bonds with more frequent
coupon payments. For example, instead of paying
coupons semiannually, indexed bonds could pay
coupons monthly, thereby reducing the necessary
length of the indexation lag from eight months to
three months.
Limitations due to taxation 
Taxation could also limit the benefits of indexed
bonds. Taxation could reintroduce some inflation
risk to indexed bonds. And, due to the tax treatment,
the demand for indexed bonds might fall.
Taxation could reintroduce inflation risk to in-
dexed bonds because the current U.S. tax code does
not distinguish increases in real income from in-
creases in nominal income due to inflation. As a
result, even if real yields do not change, an increase
in nominal income due to an increase in inflation
would boost an investor’s tax liabilities, thereby
reducing after-tax real yields.
Table 4 shows how the tax code could lead to
inflation risk in indexed bonds. The first row in the
table shows that initially, the inflation rate is 1
percent and the before-tax real yield is 3 percent so
that the before-tax nominal yield is 4 percent. With
a 30 percent flat tax rate, the tax burden is 1.2
percent (30 percent of the 4 percent nominal yield);
the after-tax nominal yield is 2.8 percent (before-tax
yield of 4 percent minus tax burden of 1.2 percent);
and the after-tax real yield is 1.8 percent (after-tax
nominal yield of 2.8 percent minus the inflation rate
of 1 percent). In the second row, inflation unexpect-
edly surges to 7 percent. Since the cash payments
of the indexed bond are adjusted for inflation, the
before-tax nominal yield rises to 10 percent. This
gain in the nominal yield, however, increases the
investor’s tax burden to 3 percent so that the after-
tax nominal yield is 7 percent, the same as the
inflation rate. Thus, the after-tax real yield declines
to zero. Because the increase in inflation increases
the nominal yield of an indexed bond and, therefore,
the tax burden of investors, even an indexed bond
with perfect indexation exposes its investors to
some inflation risk.
The inflation risk, however, would be smaller for
indexed bonds than for nominal bonds. For a nomi-
nal bond, the decline in the real yield caused by an
increase in inflation is one for one, while for an
indexed bond, the decline in the real yield is scaled
down by the tax rate. For example, in Table 4, the
six percentage point rise in inflation reduces the
after-tax real yield of the indexed bond by 1.8
percentage points (6 percent times the tax rate of 30
percent). In contrast, for a nominal bond, an unex-
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpected six percentage point increase in inflation
would reduce both the before-tax and after-tax real
yield by the full six percentage points, as shown in
the last two rows of Table 4.
24
While taxation reintroduces inflation risk to in-
dexed bonds, the information benefit to policymak-
ers remains. In general, when investment income is
taxable, the observed yields of both nominal and
indexed bonds would be adjusted by the market to
compensate  investors for the tax burden. The
adjustments for nominal and indexed bonds are
the same since both bonds are treated the same way
for tax purposes. As a result, when the difference
between nominal and indexed bond yields is used
to determine changes in real rates and inflation
expectations, the tax adjustments would cancel
each other out.
25
The second way taxation could reduce the bene-
fits of indexed bonds is that the proposed method
of taxation could reduce the demand for them. The
Treasury has indicated that, if issued, the increase
in the maturity value of the principal of an indexed
bond due to the inflation adjustment would be
treated as current income for tax purposes even
though the increase would not be paid out until
maturity.
26 By taxing income that has not been
received, the demand for indexed bonds may be
reduced to a narrow sector of investors, namely,
those who are exempted from taxes, such as IRAs
and pension funds.
27
Reducing the demand for indexed bonds to such
a narrow sector could result in a much less liquid
market for indexed bonds, thus reducing the bene-
fits of indexed bonds for two reasons. First, the
extracted information on real yields and inflation
expectations could be of lower quality since it
would reflect only the views of a narrow sector of
investors. Second, a less liquid market could reduce
the savings to the Treasury. The effect of market
liquidity is discussed in detail in the next section.
Effect of market liquidity 
While the likely tax treatment for indexed bonds
could limit the liquidity of the market, experience
abroad suggests the indexed bond market would be
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real yield 


















  in (6) 
Indexed 1 3 4 1.2 2.8 1.8 —
73 1 0370 - 1 . 8
Nominal 1 3 4 1.2 2.8 1.8 —
7 -3 4 1.2 2.8 -4.2 -6.0
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example, the nominal increase in the principal of an
indexed bond is not taxed.
28 Nevertheless, indexed
UK government bonds are less liquid than nominal
bonds—indexed bonds are turned over only about
one-third as often as nominal bonds (Butler). With
the tax effect, it is even more likely that the U.S.
market for indexed Treasury bonds would be less
liquid than the market for nominal Treasury bonds.
If it turns out that the market for indexed Treasury
bonds is much less liquid, the Treasury might have
to pay a liquidity premium when issuing indexed
bonds. A liquidity premium is the additional yield
an issuer pays to compensate investors for investing
in a less liquid asset. In a world full of uncertainties,
investors frequently need to adjust their holdings of
a security. Because it is more costly to adjust the
holdings of an illiquid asset than a similar but liquid
asset, the issuer must compensate investors by pay-
ing a higher yield. This additional yield is a liquidity
premium for investors and an additional interest
expense for the issuer. In the case of indexed bonds,
this additional expense would reduce the savings to
the Treasury from issuing them.
29
While it is possible that an indexed bond market
would be less liquid than a nominal bond market, it
is not clear that liquidity would be a serious prob-
lem. Theoretically, there is no obvious reason why
one market should be intrinsically much less liquid
than the other. Even if there is some difference in
liquidity, the difference may not be great enough to
warrant a sizable liquidity premium.
30 Furthermore,
the Treasury could use its expertise to design in-
dexed bonds to maximize market liquidity and thus
minimize any liquidity premium. The Treasury has
considerable experience in creating and maintain-
ing liquid markets. Over the years, the Treasury has
successfully designed the composition and auctions
for its nominal bonds to ensure a liquid market. In
fact, the U.S. Treasury bond market is currently one
of the most liquid markets in the world.
31
CONCLUSION
Inflation indexed Treasury bonds would be a
valuable innovation in U.S. financial markets, provid-
ing benefits to investors, the Treasury, and policy-
makers. Not only could they protect both investors
and issuers from inflation risk, but they could also
save the Treasury interest expense on its debt.
Moreover, combined with nominal bonds, indexed
bonds would provide policymakers with addi-
tional information on real interest rates and infla-
tion expectations. 
While complications arising from the actual de-
sign and issuance of indexed bonds could limit these
benefits, the limitations are not sufficient to com-
pletely offset the benefits. The choice of the infla-
tion index and the measurement bias of the index
would have little effect on the benefits, and the
effect of the indexation lags could be minimized by
issuing indexed bonds with monthly coupon pay-
ments. Although the current tax code would not
allow indexed bonds to be completely free of infla-
tion risk, the inflation risk associated with indexed
bonds would still be much less than for nominal
bonds. The tax code, however, might slightly reduce
the quality of information extracted from the bonds,
but only if the tax treatment effectively restricts the
demand for the bonds to a narrow sector of inves-
tors. Finally, the Treasury could design indexed
bonds to maximize market liquidity, which would
minimize the loss of savings due to the liquidity
premium.
On balance, the conclusion reached here is that
inflation indexed Treasury bonds could be a valu-
able addition to the spectrum of Treasury debt
instruments.
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1 This article only discusses indexed bonds issued by the U.S.
Treasury even though much of the discussion applies to the
private sector. For a discussion of the possible explanations
for the lack of private issuance of indexed bonds, see Weiner.
2 The “yield” of a bond is the discount rate that equates its
current price with the present value of its future cash flow.
This rate is also called the “internal rate of return” or “yield
to maturity.” If P is the price, N is the years left to maturity,
C is the coupon rate, and M is the maturity value, then the rate






(1 + r) k + 
M
(1 + r) N  .
In the example in the text (and in the rest of this section), P
is assumed to equal M for expositional simplicity. Thus, the
yield of the bond equals its coupon rate. When the maturity
value and price are expressed in nominal terms, r is the
nominal yield, and when the maturity value and price are
expressed in real terms, r is the real yield.
3 The Fisher identity used in the text assumes the interest
payments are compounded continuously. For discrete
compounding, the Fisher identity is r = (i - p)/( l + p). When
the inflation rate, p, is less than 10 percent, the difference
between the two versions is small. Thus, the continuously
compounded version is used in the text for expositional
simplicity.
4 Although the effect of inflation on the real yield can be
countered by a higher nominal coupon rate, inflation still
changes the pattern of the real cash flow—namely, the real
coupon payments decline over time and the real maturity
value is less than $100.
5 Using the terminology of Stanley Fischer, this article
focuses on “indexed principal bonds,” as opposed to “indexed
interest bonds.” Indexed principal bonds are currently
available in countries such as Canada and the United
Kingdom that have issued indexed bonds. An indexed interest
bond is a bond with a fixed nominal maturity value that pays
out increases in nominal principal due to inflation along with
the coupon payments. The real yields of the two types of
indexed bonds, however, are exactly the same, even though
their cash flows are quite different.
6 The nominal cash flow is simply the real cash flow plus an
inflation adjustment, which is the cumulative inflation rate
times the real cash flow.
7 Statistically, inflation is an I(1) or near I(1) series when
measured in short time intervals.
8 This change in real value due to a change in inflation is the
pure inflation risk caused by changes in the purchasing power
of the maturity value of a bond. It is conceptually different
from the price risk of a bond, which is related to the
discounting of future payments.
9 There are some other minor differences between indexed
and nominal bonds. For example, indexed bonds have longer
durations than nominal bonds with the same maturity. When
there is inflation (even a fully anticipated inflation), the
nominal bond pays part of its principal out as higher coupon
payments, whereas the indexed bond maintains its principal.
It is also worth noting that duration is essentially a nominal
concept, and thus can be quite misleading. For example, for
nominal bonds, duration represents the price risk caused by
changes in interest rates. But for indexed bonds, their prices
do not change if the change in nominal interest rates is caused
by a change in inflation.
10 Many other countries have also issued indexed bonds, but
they are mostly developing countries that have experienced
hyperinflation.
11 Actually, the real yield is fixed only if the bond is held to
maturity because the bond is still exposed to price risk, the
risk that its price will change due to changes in the real interest
rate. This risk can be avoided if a bond is held until it matures.
It is also worth noting that the price risk of a real bond will
likely be smaller than the price risk of a nominal bond because
the price of a real bond will react to changes in the real interest
rate but not to changes in inflation.
12 To further help small, inexperienced investors, the U.S.
Treasury could issue inflation indexed savings bonds (Kane).
13 Some people might consider this term premium to be an
inflation risk premium. However, it is possible that at least
part of the premium is a reward for holding a long-term asset
for a long period. If this is the case, investing in short-term
Treasury bills for inflation protection forces investors to
sacrifice this portion of the term premium, whereas the
issuance of indexed bonds allows investors to separate the
choice of the riskiness of assets from the choice of the time
horizon of assets.
14 A well-diversified portfolio of stocks can eliminate firm
specific risk but has no effect on general market risk.
15 This observation reveals another reason that investors
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namely, if both indexed and nominal Treasury bonds are
available, investors can combine them to create a portfolio
that has only inflation risk. Such a portfolio allows investors
to unbundle inflation risk and manage risk more efficiently.
Therefore, even sophisticated investors who are not directly
interested in long-term inflation-risk-free assets per se would
benefit from indexed bonds.
16 It is especially desirable for the Treasury to stabilize the
real cost of its debt since its real tax revenue moves together
with inflation. Ideally, all tax brackets, deductions, and
exemptions should be fully adjusted for inflation so that the
Treasury’s real revenue would not vary with inflation. In this
ideal case, if the Treasury’s real cost of debt was also
independent of inflation, the Treasury would not bear any
inflation risk. In reality, the tax codes are only partially
adjusted for inflation, causing the Treasury’s real revenue to
move together with inflation. As a result, when inflation
declines, the Treasury’s real tax revenue declines while the
real cost of servicing its debt rises. The imperfect indexation
of the Treasury’s revenue makes the case for indexed bonds
even stronger because the real interest cost of servicing
indexed bonds would then not rise and, therefore, would not
exacerbate the effect of declining real revenue.
17 In other words, the Fisher identity, which always holds for
realized nominal yields, realized real yields, and realized
inflation rates, will not hold ex ante if there is uncertainty.
18 The savings can be even greater if a government’s
anti-inflation policy is not credible. In such a case, expected
inflation, p, will on average be greater than actual inflation
so that the Treasury’s savings would be prem + (p - p). This
situation actually occurred in the United Kingdom in the early
1980s. Because investors did not believe the government’s
commitment to reducing inflation, issuing indexed bonds
allowed the UK government to pay at least two percentage
points less on the yields of its real debt (Walters). This savings
from incorrect inflation expectations, however, is different
from the savings from the elimination of the inflation risk
premium. First, the savings is temporary since it will
disappear when the government’s policy becomes credible.
Second, there is no net benefit to society because the
government’s savings on its interest expense is lost interest
income to investors.
19 It is possible that the inflation risk premium is negative
because bond issuers are also exposed to inflation risk and
thus could be compensated by paying a lower yield on their
bonds. If the issuers dislike inflation risk more than investors,
the inflation risk premium would be negative. While
plausible, this is highly unlikely. It is more probable that the
Treasury is less risk averse to inflation than general investors.
In this case, the inflation risk premium in Treasury bond
yields would be positive.
20 Recently, economists have used yields from UK
government indexed bonds and nominal bonds to estimate the
inflation risk premium (Deacon and Derry). They typically
find that the inflation risk premium is much higher, in the
range of 3 to 5 percent, but that it is not statistically different
from zero. Given that there is only about ten years of data, it
is not surprising that the estimates are not statistically
significant. It is also possible that there would have been a
significant inflation risk premium in nominal UK government
bond yields if there had been no indexed bonds. Theoretically,
it is plausible that investors who dislike inflation risk the most
have all been accommodated by indexed bonds, and thus
nominal bonds are mostly held by investors who do not care
about inflation risk. Consequently, the inflation risk premium
disappears. If this is indeed the case, then there would be two
sources of savings to the Treasury from issuing indexed
bonds. The first is the savings on the indexed bonds
themselves. The second is a savings on the nominal bonds
since the risk premium on nominal bonds would also fall.
21 If one is willing to make an assumption about the size of
the inflation risk premium, then subtracting this risk premium
from 4.45 gives an estimate of expected future inflation.
22 A related problem with indexing is that almost all indexes
are regularly rebased, which is necessary to accurately reflect
the changing production and consumption patterns in a
changing economy. Rebasing the index chosen for indexed
bonds could create a credibility problem for the government.
For example, investors might fear that the government would
purposely rebase the index to reduce its interest payments.
This is not likely, however, because many of the
government’s payments, such as social security benefits, are
already indexed to the CPI and there have been few
complaints. Another solution adopted by the United Kingdom
is to allow investors to redeem their bonds prior to maturity
if a rebasing reduces the payments on an indexed bond. This
solution, however, exposes the Treasury to a prepayment risk.
23 The Treasury’s total payments on nonmarketable inflation
indexed savings bonds would not rise either, as long as their
real yields are set with the guidance of actively traded indexed
bonds.
24 It is possible to change the tax code so that it does not create
inflation risk for indexed bonds. For example, replacing
income taxes with consumption taxes would solve the
problem because the increase in the nominal yield would not
automatically increase the tax burden of investors. Short of
this, it is still possible to reduce the effect of taxes by
piecemeal changes in the tax code. For UK indexed
^
^
54 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYgovernment bonds, for example, the tax effect is smaller since
capital gains in the United Kingdom are only taxed after
adjusting for inflation. In the case of indexed bonds, the
increase in the nominal maturity value of the principal due to
inflation is treated as a capital gain and, therefore, is
nontaxable.
25 There could also be an inflation risk premium term in the
yields of indexed bonds since, with taxes, even indexed bonds
have inflation risk. This term will not be canceled out by
taking the difference between nominal and indexed bond
yields because the sizes of the inflation risk premiums would
probably be different. As long as the risk premiums are
relatively stable over time, however, they will disappear when
the change in the difference between the nominal and indexed
bond yields is used to calculate the change in expected
inflation.
26 This is also how the increase in the maturity value of the
principal of a zero-coupon bond is treated. While it is
desirable to have different Treasury debt instruments treated
the same way for tax purposes, it is not clear that this is the
best way to treat them.
27 This restrictive effect has occurred for zero-coupon bonds.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the restrictive
effect for indexed bonds would be smaller than that for
zero-coupon bonds. In the case of indexed bonds, there are
current coupon payments that could be used to pay taxes. For
example, for an indexed bond with a 3 percent coupon rate,
if inflation is 4 percent, the principal becomes $104 after a
year, and the investor’s total taxable income from the bond is
the sum of the coupon payment, $3.12 (104*.03 = 3.12), and
the increase in principal, $4, which is $7.12. If the tax rate is
30 percent, the investor’s total tax liability from the bond is
$7.12*0.3 = $2.14, which can be paid by the coupon income
from the bond. Because of the coupon payments, indexed
bonds should attract more investors than zero-coupon bonds.
28 See note 24.
29 The presence of a liquidity premium would not have much
effect on the quality of the extracted information on real
interest rates and inflation expectations. Just as in the
discussion about the effect of measurement errors in the
inflation index, the estimated changes in real yields and
inflation expectations would be informative and unbiased as
long as the liquidity premium does not change over time.
30 In fact, the Treasury may not need to pay a liquidity
premium even if the indexed bond market is less liquid. The
liquidity premium depends on both the transaction cost of
trading and the expected frequency of trading. For example,
if a nominal bond is expected to be traded 20 times in its
lifetime, and the transaction cost for each trade is 0.05
percent, using backward deduction, 1 percent (20 times 0.05)
of the yield in the initial auction of the bond is to cover the
transaction cost. The transaction cost associated with each
trade of a comparable indexed bond, on the other hand, could
be 0.1 percent, twice as high. But if the indexed bond is only
expected to be traded ten times in its lifetime, the total
transaction cost in its auction yield is also 1 percent (ten times
0.1). In this case, there is no liquidity premium for the issuer
of the indexed bond, even though its market is less liquid.
31 Another effect of market liquidity is that it could make
experimental issuance of indexed bonds useless. Because
experimental issuance would typically be associated with a
very illiquid market, the liquidity premium would be high and
the information from such a market would not be
representative.
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